Macedonian National Identity

                National identity is neither a trivial concept, nor can it be boiled down to one or two events or sources.  It is a combination of characteristics like language, a common history, culture, religion and a name that binds a people together; however, no one of these characteristics belong to just one nation. One interesting case study is the Macedonian national identity. The country shares a common history with most of the formerly Yugoslavian countries. The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYR) shares an almost identical language with Serbia and Montenegro, a main Orthodox religion with these same Slavic nations, and it even shares its name with the second largest province in Greece (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016). The Macedonian flag also comes from a Greek archeological artifact from the same Greek province (Smith, 2013). With the Albanian minority being a large factor in the current government coalition and Albanian recently being established as a second official language, almost none of the elements that normally make up national identity are unique to FYR Macedonia (Balkan Service, 2019). It could even be argued that with all these similarities, Macedonia does not have its own distinct national identity. Because of many similar countries packed into a small peninsula and all bound together by a similar history, distinct national identities can only be formed around intersections of many similar traits; the combination of which are unique only to the nation.

On the surface, Macedonian national identity seems to center itself around both the name Macedonia, and the language, Macedonian, but after a closer examination, those cannot be the only two factors. With the 28-year name dispute between FYR Macedonia and Greece coming to a potential end, FYR Macedonia’s new constitutional name will be “The Republic of North Macedonia” once it has been recognized by all NATO countries after Greece voted to accept the new name in a vote earlier this week (Labropoulou, 2019). This would allow “North Macedonia” to join both the EU and NATO which is FYR Macedonia’s largest benefit from changing its name (Labropoulou, 2019). Additionally, the recent uproar with Albanian being added as a second official language of FYR Macedonia shows signs of language being a strong bond that holds the Macedonian nation together as Albanian is different than Macedonian. However, as multiple countries around Macedonia speak almost identical languages, and Greece has claimed the name Macedonia for longer than FYR Macedonia, we know that these two cannot be the main bounds of national identity.

Following this realization, one could ask if Macedonians even have a national identity. There does not seem to be one distinct national trait unique to ethnic Macedonians alone. Though this is a valid point, if the question asked could be answered by that point alone, it would remain unclear why ethnic Macedonians have disputed so long over a minor change to their name and allowing secondary official languages. However, if one considers that the Macedonian national identity revolves around the intersection of otherwise non-distinct traits, the above to questions are answered. Given Macedonian identity relies on so many different components of life, an attempt to change any single one of these components becomes an attempt to change the entire Macedonian identity. The Macedonians see the addition of Albanian as an official language as paramount to setting the Albanian minority as equally important as the Macedonian majority. The name change is additionally seen as acknowledging that Greece contains the real “Macedonia”. The years preceding the changes this year were manifestations of scared Macedonians, worried about losing their identity as a people, and being overcome by both the outside and in. The one surprisingly result of all this is how infrequently Macedonians villainize the Greeks.

Despite the Greek dispute with Macedonia over their name, Macedonians show very few signs of “othering” the Greeks. During times when many Greeks were protesting the Macedonian name change, the Macedonians were more worried about their internal significant other -- the Albanians -- and were protesting the language change as well (Al Jazeera, 2019). Macedonia also changed their flag to appease the Greeks after initially choosing the starburst, a historic Greek cultural symbol, for their flag (Smith, 2013). Though the Greeks have been othering the Macedonians, the same has not been returned. This shows that FYR Macedonia does not view Greece as either a territorial or cultural threat. However, both changing their flag and their name to appease Greece shows that Macedonia views Greece as a necessary evil to be dealt with in order for Macedonia to join international organizations. Conversely, ethnic Macedonians strongly “other” one of their internal ethnic minorities.

Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia have a tense history. Macedonia accepted hundreds of thousands of Albanian refugees in the 1990’s due to the conflict in Kosovo (UNHCR, 2004). Supporting these refugees hindered the Macedonian economy and caused ethnic tensions as Albanians asked for more and more concessions (UNHCR, 2004). After some of the Albanian protests turned violent, and into riots due to both extremist Albanian groups and overly aggressive police officers, casualties occurred on both sides (UNHCR, 2004). Though NATO sent troops to stabilize Macedonia, due to the continued flux of refugees, and the lack of compromise on either side, conflicts continued to erupt for years (UNHCR, 2004). This culminated with terrorist attacks from an Albanian separatist group, and by military retaliation by the Macedonian government (UNHCR, 2004).

Though this conflict was resolved in the early 2000’s, the tensions never fully subsided. This has led to Albanians becoming an internal other for the ethnic Macedonians. This is shown in current events by massive protests both when the first ethnically Albanian Speaker of the Parliament was chosen, and when Albanian was added as a second language (Al Jazeera, 2019). Albanians both posed a threat to territorial integrity and are currently seen as a threat on the cultural unity of FYR Macedonia. It likely will take much time before the tensions from the dispute will subside, and Albanians will likely remain a significant other of ethnic Macedonians for the coming years.

Through many facets, these smaller Balkan countries may seem almost identical, but these intersections create a national identity. They created a strong enough identity to cause FYR Macedonia and the other former Yugoslavian countries to break away from each other regardless of the bloodshed that was caused. It is the same national identity that has caused large surges of nationalism, to both preserve the Macedonian name, and to refuse to give large concessions to the minority group, the Albanians. The intersections make Macedonia its own unique country and nation amongst similar neighbors in the Balkans.                     

Reference list

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